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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long held that its goal in crafting the
jurisprudence surrounding sexual harassment cases brought under Title
VII has been to eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace, to
encourage victims to report harassment promptly, and to set in place
adequate incentives for employers to stave off the harms associated with
sexual harassment. 1 This Article, however, contends that in constructing
the framework within which sexual harassment claims are adjudicated,
*Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. I wish to thank Janet
Reinke for her assistance throughout the completion of this article. I would like to thank Professor
Matthew Mirow for his comments and insight. This article was completed with the research
assistance and hard work of my research assistant, Vanessa Ortiz. I wish to thank my husband,
Joshua Stone, and my parents, Ted and Donna Bauchner, for their unfaltering love and support. I
would also like to thank Sam Estreicher.
1. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see generally Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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the Supreme Court might have actually incentivized employers to deal
with each isolated harassment complaint in a vacuum, ensuring nothing
more than that the specific reporting victim at issue is not harassed again
by the same harasser. 2
Based on the affirmative defense available to defendant employers
in cases in which no tangible employment action has been inflicted by a
harasser, a one-time incident between a given harasser and a given
victim, even one of rape, may very well be not ultimately compensable
under Title VII. 3 Thus, a recidivist harasser who harasses different
victims at different times may, under the current state of the law, repeat
and even escalate his behavior, without incurring Title VII liability for
his employer. This Article proposes that courts change the way in which
they adjudicate Title VII disputes by evaluating the harm avoidance
demonstrated by plaintiffs and employers in light of the totality of what
each party knew or should have known about the potential harm, and
what each party did or could have done to prevent it. Specifically, this
Article is premised on the ideas that 1) harassment complaints are,
typically, initially dealt with internally; often, an employer will
remediate reported harassment by ordering or granting a transfer to
separate a harasser and his victim; 4 and 2) many harassers are, in fact
recidivists. 5
Employer liability for supervisory harassment is conferred
automatically upon defendants when a plaintiff has, in the course of her
harassment, incurred or endured a “tangible employment action,” like a
pay cut, demotion, or termination, which is seen to have been ratified by
the entity. 6 In harassment scenarios where no such action was taken, the
defendant can interpose an affirmative defense, asserting both that “the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior,” 7 and that “the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 8
As one scholar has noted, “[b]y creating this . . . affirmative defense for
employers, the Supreme Court is, in effect, telling women that they must
be willing to come forward and complain to employers about sexual

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See discussion infra Section III.
See discussion infra Section IV.
See discussion infra Section II.
See discussion infra Section II.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Id.
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harassment before filing suit. Otherwise, they risk losing their right to
obtain any legal redress under federal law.” 9
Courts have found again and again that the law’s requirement that
an employer provide a prompt remedial response to a harassment
complaint is met where the harasser is retained (with or without a slap
on the wrist) and merely transferred away from the victim. 10 Where the
harasser in question is a recidivist, this contravenes Title VII’s goal of
eradicating harassment. Specifically, employers with harassers who
otherwise add value to their enterprise are incentivized to retain these
individuals, and, fully cognizant of their harassing or violent tendencies,
are not amply deterred from merely shuffling or transferring them
around so as to put a bandaid on the instant situation. 11 The courts have
given little regard, and thus employers have given little thought, to the
plight of future victims subjected to the supervision of recidivist
harassers or abusers.
The premise of this Article, then, is straightforward. Because so
many harassers are recidivists, 12 and because of the fact that so many
employers are able, under the current state of the law, to fulfill their
obligation to remediate reported harassment by simply separating the
victim and her harasser, 13 many employees will fall victim to known
harassers. Moreover, because of the way in which courts have applied
the affirmative defense, the employer, having never received a complaint
from that victim, will typically evade liability for any “new” act of
harassment (i.e., one with a new victim), irrespective of how severe it
was. 14 This Article thus posits that in instances where an employer
situated a known harasser to supervise a new group of people, the risk
that the harasser will offend again should fall on the employer, which
acted affirmatively and with knowledge of the existing risk in retaining
the employee, rather than on the employee, who, under current case law,

9. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call For
Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 2006).
11. See id. at 569-70.
12. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall et al., Initiation, Desistance, and Persistence of Men’s Sexual
Coercion, 74 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 732, 732 (2006) (“[T]here is evidence of
sexual offenders being at higher risk for reoffense than other types of offenders.”). “In a review of
61 studies and nearly 24,000 sexual offenders, the recidivism rate for new sexual offenses within a
4- to 5-year period was 13.4%.” Id.
13. West, supra note 9, at 461 (“A disturbing trend is developing among the federal courts.
They are interpreting ‘reasonable care’ in the first prong of the new affirmative defense to require
only minimal prevention efforts by the employer.”).
14. See discussion infra Section VII.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
STONE_FINAL

1062

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1059

must absorb the initial act of harassment and report it before she can
potentially be compensated under Title VII. 15 Courts can accomplish
this by finding that the affirmative defense, designed to afford employers
notice of a problem and an opportunity to remediate it, cannot be met
where the plaintiff has sustained otherwise actionable harm without the
opportunity to report it before it occurred, and where the employer
situated a known harasser as that victim’s supervisor. 16
Specifically, when dealing with a single act of recidivist harassment
that cannot be reported preemptively, but which rises, due to its severity,
to the level of being actionable, courts ought to find that the defendant
cannot, as a matter of law, meet its burden of showing that “the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior.” 17 Thus, in cases involving single acts of
the most noxious and nefarious variety, such as rapes and physical
assaults, plaintiffs who would otherwise fall through the cracks for want
of an opportunity to report the harm, may be made whole for the harm
that they have sustained in certain circumstances.
In 1998, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve widespread
disagreement and confusion among circuit courts as to how and when to
impute liability to a plaintiff’s employer for supervisory sexual
harassment sustained by the plaintiff. 18 In the cases of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 19 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 20 the
Supreme Court, mindful of its previous holding that “agency principles
constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory
harassment,” 21 was careful to steep its resolution of the issue in the law
of agency. 22 In this vein, the Court noted that while “a supervisor’s
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a
particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is
aided by the agency relation,” 23 essentially, “most workplace tortfeasors
are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of
the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive

15. See discussion infra Section VII.
16. See discussion infra Section VII.
17. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
18. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
19. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742.
20. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
21. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986)).
22. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 776; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55.
23. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
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pool of potential victims.” 24 The Court thus concluded that it could not
confer strict liability upon employers for all acts of supervisory
harassment because “[t]he aided in the agency relation standard . . .
requires the existence of something more than the employment relation
itself.” 25
So, the Court reasoned, a supervisor’s tangible employment action
transforms into an act of the employer because:
[w]hen a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency
relation. . . . As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other
person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of
injury . . . . Tangible employment actions fall within the special
province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the
company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions
affecting other employees under his or her control. Tangible
employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible
employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a
company act . . . . The supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of
26
the enterprise and use its internal processes.

The Court thus bifurcated harassment claims, isolating those in
which a harassed employee sustained what it called a “tangible
employment action,” which “constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.” 27 A defendant employer, the
Court held, was automatically liable for sexual harassment where the
plaintiff had sustained a tangible employment action. 28 In the absence
of a tangible employment action, the Court held that the plaintiff’s prima
facie case, once successfully made, would be rendered vulnerable to the
interposition of a two-pronged affirmative defense asserting that 1) “the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior,” 29 and 2) “that the plaintiff employee

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Id. at 761-62.
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unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 30
In 2004, the Supreme Court held that even a constructive discharge,
the legal point at which a court determines that any reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s shoes would have felt compelled to quit employment, is
not tantamount to a tangible employment action sufficient to insulate a
plaintiff’s claim from the interposition of the affirmative defense. 31 The
Court held that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive
discharge, the Ellerth and Faragher analysis . . . calls for extension of
the affirmative defense to the employer,” because the plaintiff’s decision
to leave does not, unlike an act that bears the imprimatur of the
enterprise, afford the defendant notice of the harassment. 32 Thus, any
harassment scenario, irrespective of its severity, that does not entail an
“official company act” that somehow ratifies the harassment, appears
vulnerable to the affirmative defense. 33
The promulgation of Title VII’s jurisprudential framework in
Faragher and Ellerth met with a skeptical response from many
scholars. 34 Professor Joanna Grossman examined the promulgation of

30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
31. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
32. Id. at 148-49 (adding that “[a]bsent such an official act, the extent to which the
supervisor’s misconduct has been aided by the agency relation, as we earlier recounted . . . is less
certain”). The Suders decision was eagerly awaited by many members of the legal and academic
communities. See, e.g., Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote, The Supreme Court’s Suders Problem:
Wrong Question, Wrong Facts Determining Whether Constructive Discharge is a Tangible
Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 819, 844 (2004) (arguing, after certiorari had
been granted by the Court, that Suders’ “resignation was ‘ratified by the employer,’” and
contending that the Supreme Court should “guarantee that resignations classified as constructive
discharges would genuinely be the functional equivalents of formal discharges”).
33. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 148-49.
34. Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment,
61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 671 (2000) (“[The Faragher and Ellerth decisions], far from imposing
additional liability on innocent employers, . . . instead created a virtual safe harbor that protects
employers from liability unless their own conduct is found wanting.”); Goldsmith, supra note 32, at
819, 844 (arguing, “if the Supreme Court were to resolve the inquiry of whether a constructive
discharge is a tangible employment action in the context of a decision applying the [notice]
approach it would answer in the affirmative”); Kerri L. Stone, Consenting Adults? Why Women
Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment are Faring Better in Court Than Those Who Say No
. . . and Why They Shouldn’t, YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2008).
[W]hen the [Faragher/Ellerth] cases and the principles and preferences that have
emerged from their jurisprudence are properly viewed, it is clear that modern society
continues to suffer from what may be called “Lewinsky syndrome,” a tendency to
“rescue” from the consequences of their actions younger or less powerful women who
decide to initiate or enter into intimate relations with powerful, often older men, for
whom they work.
Id.
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the strictures placed upon liability in Faragher and Ellerth and observed
that:
[t]he common law extends to a dog the ‘prestigious distinction’ of
being entitled to one bite before its owner becomes strictly liable for
damages. While this common law privilege for dog owners has been
largely abrogated by statute, the Supreme Court recently adopted a
variation of it for employers of supervisors who sexually harass their
subordinates. 35

Essentially, Professor Grossman explained, the Supreme Court’s
view on enterprise liability for supervisory harassment, “ostensibly
grounded in traditional agency principles,” 36 means that
employers are now liable for the hostile environment created by their
supervisors, for the most part, only after being given a chance to react
and failing to do so. In other words, for employers of harassing
supervisors, as for the dog owners that preceded them, the first bite is
free. 37

The significance of this insight cannot be overstated. For better or
worse, the Supreme Court has attempted to mediate and negotiate a
balance between compensating harassment victims and contouring a
reasonable scope of employer liability. 38 That having been said, when
an employer knowingly situates a harasser as a new potential victim’s
supervisor, it may not have acted negligently as a de facto matter, but the
employer ought to be seen as having assumed the risk that it did not
adequately cure the problem because the harasser may offend again in
his new situation. Thus, the victim, who had no ability to know of her
harasser’s predilections or violent tendencies and had no ability to
prospectively ward off harm prior to its occurrence, should be able to
hold the defendant, who had every opportunity to act, for example by
terminating or adequately disciplining the harasser, legally accountable
for the harm sustained.
II. PREMISES
There are two premises upon which this idea is based. The first is

35. Grossman, supra note 34, at 671.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (“[A]ccomodat[ing] the agency principle of vicarious
liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees . . . .”).
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that the population of supervisory harassers is rife with recidivist
offenders whose behavior, far from stemmed by the slaps on the wrist
they often received, often escalates over time. 39 The second is that most
claims of harassment are typically dealt with internally and not argued
before a court. However, in those cases that are adjudicated, courts have
sanctioned the mere physical separation of a harasser and his
complaining victim as a legally adequate remedial response to a
complaint. 40
It is often the case that sexual harassers who engage in physical
assaults or rape of their subordinates are recidivist offenders in that they
either have a criminal record of sexual violence or a discernible
tendency toward sexual harassment revealed by their record on the job. 41
It is often the case that a sexual harasser has already engaged in
harassing or even criminal behavior, either at his current workplace or a
previous one. 42
Moreover, employers will often slap harassers on the wrist and
merely transfer them away from their victims, rather than expose the
harasser’s wrongdoings and end their opportunities to engage in such
acts. 43 Most of the information that scholars have gathered about the
handling of sexual harassment under the law comes from court records

39. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 350 (1990).
40. Hall et al., supra note 12, at 732 (“[R]ecidivism rates are most commonly based on
official arrest data, which may underestimate actual rates of offending.”).
41. See Paul, supra note 39, at 350 (“[I]t is undoubtedly true that many practitioners of sexual
harassment are recidivists. . . .”).
42. See West, supra note 9, at 505 (“Large employers, primarily public employers, face the
problem of repeat harassers.”). See also Jordana Mishory, Teen Sues Over Sex with Boss, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV. June 20, 2007, at 1 (discussing a case in which a fifteen year old and her mother
sued McDonalds over what they alleged was her sexual harassment by a McDonalds franchisee. In
the suit, the teenager alleged that her harasser dated another minor employee prior to commencing
his inappropriate relationship with her and that the company knew about this.); Paul, supra note 39,
at 350.
43. See Diane Gentry, Title VII Limitations — Keeping the Workplace Hostile, 9 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 393, 406 (2003).
[T]he remedies provided by employers to redress harassment further promotes sexism
because they do not really change the male dominated work culture. Employees who are
harassed are “protected” by their employer, while the offending party may be re-routed,
and the behavior temporarily pre-empted . . . . Separating women from individual
harassers without addressing the pervasiveness of sexist conduct does nothing to
effectively end sexism. Instead, it reinforces the perception that women do not belong in
the workplace.
Id.
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and opinions in cases brought against defendant entities. 44 However,
most claims of sexual harassment on the job are handled internally. 45
Numerous cases’ facts and records reveal that separating a harasser
and a complaining victim is a common practice when employers attempt
to grapple with complaints of harassment made through established
internal channels. 46 To the extent that a harassing supervisor adds value
to a defendant enterprise, it has every reason to want to allay a
harassment situation without losing or exacting too much retribution
upon him; he may even be promoted within the enterprise. 47
All too often employers respond to allegations of sexual harassment
by offering the complainant an opportunity to transfer to a different
branch, division, or department. 48 In one particularly egregious
scenario, a sexual harassment complainant requested a transfer so that
she would no longer be under the supervision of her alleged harasser.
She was subsequently discharged after rejecting the only transfer
offered, which was to a unit in which she had been physically attacked
previously by a client. 49
One scholar has taken note of the problem of employers retaining
and resituating harassers as other employees’ supervisors, suggesting
that:
if an employer continues to employ a harassing supervisor or other
employee, employers should be obligated to inform employees who
must work with the harasser about the resolution of the prior complaint

44. See West, supra note 9, at 465-66.
45. Dave Simanoff, Law Firms Address Harassment Issues, TAMPA TRIB., April 6, 2005, at 1
(calling harassment at law firms “an industrywide issue often dealt with behind closed doors”).
46. See, e.g., McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2005); Scarberry v.
Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2003); Stephens v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 220
F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2000); Mikels v. City of Durham, N.C., 183 F.3d 323, 326 (4th Cir. 1999);
Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
47. See, e.g., Simanoff, supra note 45, at 1 (noting that in 2005, a prominent Florida law firm
promoted to its number three spot a partner who had been disciplined for sexual harassment).
48. See, e.g., Stuart v. GMC, 217 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant employer's
response to sexual harassment was adequate as a matter of law where it promptly investigated the
complaint, redistributed sexual harassment policy, and offered the plaintiff a transfer to a different
department, thus ending the harassment); Dees v. Johnson Controls World Serv. Inc., 168 F.3d 417,
420-21 (11th Cir. 1999) (following plaintiff’s formal complaint of harassment, employer’s prompt
remedial response of transferring her to another department warranted its summary judgment on her
sexual harassment claim); see, e.g., Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 779 (10th Cir. 2000) (transferring
sexual harassment complainant was a reasonable remedial reaction to complaint); Webb v.
Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc., 139 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable remedial
response to offer to transfer plaintiff to another office so that she would have no further contact with
her alleged harasser).
49. Yancey v. Nat’l Ctr. on Inst. and Alternatives, 986 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Md. 1997).
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and any discipline taken. Otherwise, if the person harasses another
employee, the employer should be liable for greater damages for the
subsequent harassment. 50

Thus, it is clear that unwitting first-time victims of harassment are being
victimized, in many cases, by recidivist harassers, known to be such by
their employers.
III. THE LAW INCENTIVIZES MANY EMPLOYERS’ “BANDAID”
APPROACH TO DEALING WITH RECIDIVIST HARASSERS: AN
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
These premises having been established, the problem inherent in a
workforce replete with recidivist harassers that companies are likely to
transfer rather than terminate or reform is compounded by the courts’
treatment of these scenarios. The problem of courts’ failure to hold
employers to high enough standards for staving off harm is epitomized
by a 2002 Seventh Circuit sexual harassment case. In Longstreet v.
Illinois Department of Corrections, 51 the plaintiff alleged that two
incidents, occurring thirty days apart, amounted to actionable sexual
harassment. 52 The first incident involved a co-worker verbally harassing
her and masturbating in front of her, 53 and the second was a sexual
assault that she sustained from a different co-worker. 54 As the court
recited, “[i]t is, we think, difficult to determine which of the two
incidents [she] complains about, if true, was worse. Both were close to
9’s on a scale of 10.” 55
As the court further explained, however, because the individual in
the first incident was, “in all practical respects” 56 fired, while the other
harassment (the alleged sexual assault) was an “isolated incident,” her
evidence could “hardly” form the basis of an actionable sexual
harassment claim. 57 The plaintiff could not contend that the defendant’s
actions were “not sufficient to remedy the harassment.” 58 “The answer,”
the court deduced,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

West, supra note 9, at 506.
Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t. of Corr., 276 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Longstreet, 276 F.3d at 381.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 382.
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seems to be that her real contention is that the DOC was negligent not
so much in its response to her complaints but in not preventing the
harassment in the first place. She says that both Bester and Bills
harassed others before her. The contention is that if the DOC had taken
reasonable steps in connection with those prior incidents, these
unpleasant things would not have happened to her. 59

Recognizing that there had been a prior incident of one of her
harassers having harassed another woman at work and been reassigned,
the court nonetheless rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “if the men
had been properly dealt with in the other incidents, they would not have
been recidivists,” 60 and that although the other harassed employee “was
satisfied with the resolution of her case, the DOC had an independent
obligation to make a further investigation and to make certain that [he]
clearly understood that his reassignment was a result of his bad
behavior.” 61
The court acknowledged that “[a]n employer must take more care
to protect employees, depending on the seriousness of the harassment,” 62
but equivocated, stating that, “[i]n this case, we must determine how far
those principles can be stretched.” 63 Refusing to link its assessment of
the defendant’s handling of the prior instance of harassment to employer
liability for any harm sustained in the plaintiff’s current case, the court
determined that “[t]he proper measure of the reasonableness of the
DOC’s response was dependent on the facts and circumstances of that
case. Short of litigating Terry’s situation in Longstreet’s case, there is
little to be said about it except that the DOC response was not obviously
unreasonable.” 64 Rejecting the idea that the defendant was obligated to
be on notice of the possibility that the harasser would be a recidivist, the
court concluded that:
[i]t would push the role of deterrence too far to say that a response
which seemed to be within the realm of reasonableness in one situation
can, if ultimately it did not have the proper deterrent effect, be the sole
basis for liability in another case even if the employer’s response in the
second case was clearly sufficient. 65

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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Disciplining the harasser without firing him the first time, the court
conceded, “did not cure him of disgusting and boorish behavior,” 66 and
the plaintiff’s argument that she would have been spared the indignity of
her own harassment if he had been fired after his first offense did have
“superficial appeal.” 67 Nonetheless, the court found,
we cannot conclude that an employer is subject to what amounts to
strict liability for every second incident of harassment committed by an
employee, especially when the first incident was far less serious than
the second . . . . To say that the employer must be held liable in the
second incident would be to impose strict liability on an employer any
time an employee commits two acts of harassment. It would be a twostrikes-and-you’re-out rule. To be safe from liability, an employer
would always have to discharge a person accused of any kind of
harassment because no employer can predict with certainty, any more
than any judge sentencing a criminal defendant can predict with
68
certainty, that an offender will not offend again.

This case illustrates how a plaintiff may be denied compensation for
harassment which she could not foresee but which her employer may
have been able to prevent even without her complaint.
IV. FACTORING IN THE GOALS OF TITLE VII
It goes without saying that one’s rights to bodily safety and
integrity in the workplace are inviolable. Along those lines, numerous
courts have held that a single instance of physical violence may rise to
the level of an actionable hostile work environment, which, according to
the Supreme Court must include conduct that is “severe or pervasive.” 69
66. Longstreet, 276 F.3d at 383.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).. See also Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that plaintiff’s being called a “bitch,” being pinned against a wall, and having had her wrist twisted
until she sustained ligament damage, drew blood, and required surgery created an actionable hostile
work environment because “[a]lthough less severe acts of harassment must be frequent or part of a
pervasive pattern of objectionable behavior in order to rise to an actionable level, ‘extremely
serious’ acts of harassment do not”); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir.
1998) (“[E]ven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s
employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability.”)
(quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162
F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding a one time event in which a waitress had her hair pulled
by a customer, who also grabbed and placed his mouth on her breast was severe enough to create an
actionable hostile work environment); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL
196616, at *3-4 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000) (rejecting the argument that physical assault committed

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/8

12

Stone: License to Harass
STONE_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

LICENSE TO HARASS

1071

It would seem to follow that allowing recovery under Title VII for a
first-time, single incident of physical/sexual violence by a recidivist
harasser comports entirely with the objectives and goals of Title VII, as
well as those of the Supreme Court in crafting its jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court declared in Faragher that properly determining the
contours of respondeat superior liability for supervisory sexual
harassment “calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and
malleable factors . . . but rather an inquiry into the reasons that would
support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within the
scope of a supervisor’s employment, and the reasons for the opposite
view.” 70 The linchpin of the proper query, or, as the Supreme Court put
it, the “integrating principle” of respondeat superior is “that the
employer should be liable for those faults that may be fairly regarded as
risks of his business, whether they are committed in furthering it or
not.” 71 It ought to go without saying that merely transferring or
shuffling around a known harasser without regard for what he does until
a new instance of harassment is reported engenders a risk for an
employer that may only be seen as attendant to the defendant’s business
and the way in which it knowingly chose to run it.
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Faragher that Title VII aims
“to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful

by defendant’s “employee was simply a one-time incident and was therefore not pervasive enough
to create an abusive environment,” because it rose “to the same level of severity as sexual assault,
and objectively carried sexual overtones”); Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“We have no doubt a single incident of rape can satisfy the first prong of employer
liability under a hostile work environment theory.”); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the
victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII
liability.”), abrogated on other grounds by, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
There have, however, been numerous occasions in which single instances of sexual assault/physical
sexual conduct were held not to rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment. See,
e.g., Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding male supervisor’s one-time act of
rubbing his penis against employee’s buttocks in the presence of co-workers was not severe or
pervasive enough to create sexually hostile work environment under Title VII); Lee-Crespo v.
Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 38-39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding female
supervisor’s improper remarks to employee, which included telling employee to invite her to lunch
and making comments about plaintiff’s co-workers’ “private lives and sexual preferences . . . ” and,
on one occasion approaching the plaintiff “from behind, hugg[ing] her, and whisper[ing] in her ear a
request for a cookie from another table[,]” did not establish a hostile work environment); Tatum v.
Hyatt Corp., 918 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding single episode in which supervisor wrapped
his arms around plaintiff and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to demonstrate a
hostile work environment; “absent the most stringent circumstances, courts have refused to hold that
one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment”).
70. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797.
71. Id. (quoting Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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employment discrimination,” 72 but stated that its “primary objective,”
was “not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” 73 Thus, the Court
concluded that it was bifurcating the realms of cases with and without
tangible employment actions and crafting the affirmative defense as the
EEOC wanted, to “recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to
prevent violations and give credit here to employers who make
reasonable efforts to discharge their duty.” 74
Each of these aspirations comports squarely with courts preventing
the affirmative defense from blocking a plaintiff’s claim that she was
raped or assaulted in a one-time incident by a known harasser and had
no opportunity to make meaningful use of complaint channels before
sustaining harm. In the first place, a victim who has withstood the most
noxious and egregious form of sexual harassment, an assault to, and
violation of, her bodily integrity in her workplace or within the scope of
her employment, will not be precluded from recovering damages.
Further, avoiding harm is a goal best achieved when the law discourages
employers, who are uniquely situated to know of supervisors with a
history of harassment yet knowingly or recklessly place those
individuals in a position to harass other victims, from doing so.
Moreover, while it may be appropriate to credit employers who make
reasonable efforts to stave off the harm associated with harassment,
allowing certain employers to insulate themselves against liability
sometimes rewards behavior that foments repeated instances of
harassment.
The Supreme Court in Faragher stated that another policy
underpinning of its creation of the affirmative defense was the common
law precept of harm avoidance and mitigation by the victim, which is the
notion that if a victim “unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover
damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.” 75 Thus, the
Supreme Court determined, under its framework that “if damages could
reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer
should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have
avoided.” 76 Again, permitting recovery in cases involving the one-time
act of physical violence of a recidivist harassing supervisor does not
contravene the precept of harm avoidance because the victim in such a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 807.
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case has no opportunity to furnish notice to the employer, and has
already sustained harm that he or she could not have prevented. This
Article next explores precisely how courts might go about applying the
two-pronged affirmative defense in such a way as to accord less
accountability to victims with no opportunity to report grievous harm
that they sustain and confer more responsibility on employers who
assume the risk of retaining a harassing supervisor.
V. CIRCLING AROUND A SOLUTION
An obvious thought is that perhaps a court might consider a onetime incident of physical/sexual violence to be a tangible employment
action, removing the availability of the affirmative defense. Several
plaintiffs, however, have tried to make this argument to no avail, and
federal courts have unceremoniously and summarily rejected it. Other
courts have refrained from addressing the issue altogether.
In the pre-Suders Eleventh Circuit case of Walton v. Johnson, 77 the
plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued her employer under
Title VII for sexual harassment, alleging that her district manager
engaged in a variety of harassing behaviors on several occasions. 78
These behaviors included kissing her, grabbing her inappropriately, and,
eventually, raping her. 79 In the course of resolving her claim, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to address Walton’s argument, made for the
first time in her Reply Brief, that “the alleged rapes . . . by themselves,
constitute tangible employment actions,” 80 noting that the argument
“was not raised below.” 81
However, it appears that even in that pre-Suders era, courts were
poised to view even the most horrific criminal assaults on victims at
work as falling short of being tangible employment actions. 82 In 2003, a
district court in Virginia, adjudicating a harassment suit in which the
plaintiff was allegedly “rape[d] at knife-point,” found that “[e]ven if [the
alleged harasser] were a supervisor, there was no tangible employment
action taken . . . that would short-circuit [the plaintiff’s] ability to claim
the Faragher / Ellerth defense,” 83 because “[t]here was nothing done to
77. Walton v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 1276.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1283 n.10.
81. Id.
82. See generally Cooper v. City of Roanoke, VA, No. Civ. 7:02-CV-00673, 2003 WL
24117704 (W.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2003).
83. Id. at *4.
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[the plaintiff] that changed her employment condition through the use of
supervisory power.” 84 The court observed that “nothing . . . made [the
plaintiff] defenseless against the harassment in ways that comparable
conduct by a mere co-worker would not have done.” 85
Certainly following the Supreme Court’s 2004 pronouncement in
Suders that the touchstone for the analysis of when an act is a tangible
employment action is whether or not an “official company act” took
place, 86 it appears that even an actual rape would likely not qualify as a
tangible employment action sufficient to confer vulnerability to the
affirmative defense upon a plaintiff’s claim.
In Allen v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 87 a sexual
harassment plaintiff alleged that she had endured tangible employment
actions in the form of her supervisor’s “‘making of unlawful threats of
discipline against her,’ his ‘physical assault, and his ‘unfair and
discriminatory treatment . . . .’” 88
The district court rejected this
argument summarily, briefly noting that “[t]he physical assault did not
change her employment status or reduce her job benefits.” 89
Another district court characterized a sexual harassment plaintiff’s
contention that assaults she had sustained constituted tangible
employment actions as an “effort to circumvent the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense,” 90 holding that:
[the] argument obviously lacks merit [because i]f sexually harassing
behavior by a supervisor could, in itself, be construed as a tangible
employment action, the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and
Faragher would be a dead letter. That is, every case involving sexual
harassment by a supervisor would also involve a tangible employment
action and would therefore preclude resort to the affirmative defense. 91

The problem seems intractable; as repugnant as the notion of being
raped in the course of performing one’s own job and by the supervisor

84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004) (“[W]hen an official act
does not underlie the constructive discharge, the Ellerth and Faragher analysis . . . calls for
extension of the affirmative defense to the employer.”).
87. Allen v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Serv., No. 2:05-CV-00707, 2007 WL 2815569, at *8
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2007).
88. Id. at *8.
89. Id.
90. Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Serv.,Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
91. Id. at 1267. The Court went on to note, “[a]ssuming [that] the Supreme Court does not
intend its rulings to lack all force and effect, this Court declines to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of
‘tangible employment action.’” Id.
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assigned by one’s own employer is, unless the rapist is aided by
something more than the agency relationship itself, the affirmative
defense may preclude recovery. 92 The mere situation of one who would
rape or assault a subordinate as a supervisor is insufficient to warrant the
imposition of respondeat superior liability under the current framework
employed by courts in Title VII cases. 93 As stated, the Supreme Court
has ruled that automatic employer liability for supervisory harassment
“requires the existence of something more than the employment
relationship itself.” 94 Thus, it appears that even a one-time supervisory
incident of the highest magnitude, like a violent rape, may permit an
employer to elude legal accountability for Title VII damages.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
So what is the best way for courts to deal with one-time incidents of
harassment severe enough to be actionable by themselves because they
transform the victim’s terms and conditions of employment, but which
do not qualify as tangible employment actions? In such situations,
courts should, in their analysis of the first prong of the affirmative
defense, refuse to view the incident in a vacuum. Thus, the fact that the
harasser and the victim may never before have interacted with one
another should not be dispositive proof that the employer should not
have anticipated the harassing behavior and could not have “exercised
reasonable care to prevent” it. Rather, by undertaking a fact-intensive
query, the court should look at 1) any knowledge that the employer
might have had as to the fact that the harasser at issue was prone to
inflict harm; and 2) what, if any, actions it had previously taken
regarding the discipline, education, transfer, and situation of the harasser
as a supervisor, to determine whether or not the employer exercised
reasonable care in the prevention of the harm inflicted. A proposal that
revamps the analysis of the affirmative defense in order to further Title
VII’s deterrence goals is not without precedent. 95

92. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 760.
95. In 2002, Professor Martha West proposed that courts require that in order to have a legally
effective mechanism for processing and dealing with complaints, employers should furnish
information about the resolution of prior complaints to employees on a regular basis and provide
documentation for employees as to the actions it took in addressing prior sexual harassment
complaints. West, supra note 9, at 497-98. As Professor West explained:
These steps would communicate to women that their fears are, in fact, unreasonable, and
that they should be willing to report harassment in a timely fashion. If employers do not
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This query should turn on a multitude of factors, and a host of
varied scenarios will necessitate judgment calls as to the ultimate
determination. For example, when examining what knowledge about the
harasser’s potential to harass might be imputed to the employer, ought it
matter whether such knowledge was gleaned from the harasser’s
documented experience while in the defendant’s employ, or from
information received from a previous employer, a news report, a
criminal record, or even from industry scuttlebutt? 96 Moreover, how are
the courts to measure one’s “potential” to harass? Is it reasonable to
predict that a habitual offender who is known to repeatedly tell
inappropriate jokes in the office will escalate his behavior to include
sexual assault? Should it matter how much time has elapsed between
incidents; after a long period of unremarkable behavior, might a
harasser’s slate be reasonably “wiped clean” by the employer? Finally,
ought the courts treat an employer who has done more to discipline and
educate a past offender differently from one who has done less or
nothing upon a repeat offense; or should the fact and the severity of the
new offense, a priori, establish that the former employer fell short of
reasonable efforts to prevent it?
These are important questions that courts will have to answer if
they adopt this proposed approach to the adjudication of the affirmative
defense. The best way in which to address them is for courts to create a
matrix in which to evaluate the strength of the factors of how and how
much a defendant employer knew about the offender’s tendency to
harass, the strength of the evidence demonstrating this tendency, and
what, if anything, the employer did in the face of this knowledge. 97 If
voluntarily release information to employees about the resolution of prior complaints,
plaintiffs’ attorneys should seek such information in future cases in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of employer procedures and to challenge an employer’s claim of
reasonable care under the affirmative defense.
Id..
96. The question of what an employer should have known, in addition to what it actually
knew, about a supervisor’s work and criminal history should also be implicated in this analysis.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, employers will need to be aware of the relevant federal,
state, and local laws that entitle them to or prohibit them from procuring such information. See,
e.g., COL. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204 (3)(a)(X)(A)(2007) (“[T]he custodian may deny the right of
inspection of the following records . . . [a]ny records of sexual harassment complaints and
investigations . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2005) (“[I]nformation which is deemed to be
confidential . . . [includes] information generated by or on behalf of public employers or public
employees in connection with any sexual harassment complaint.”).
97. See West, supra note 9, at 519. Professor West has advanced the argument that employers
ought to inform employees that their new supervisor has a history of harassment. Id. She argues
that:
Just as employers are not liable for the release of information at work about employees
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courts use these guidelines, a workable jurisprudence developed against
a variety of factual backdrops will emerge. Such a jurisprudence will
counsel potential defendants to react to instances of harassment not only
promptly and effectively vis-à-vis the reporting victim at issue, but with
an eye toward the potential liability they could incur (or rather, fail to
shield themselves from). This will not only promote better discipline of
harassers, but will also encourage better record keeping, reporting, and
information sharing within enterprises. 98 One scholar has already
recommended that employers’ reasonable actions upon handling a
complaint include publicizing what occurred and warning potential new
victims of a retained harasser. Professor West warns “[i]f victims and
other potential targets of harassment are not informed, serious
harassment could recur, an employer’s liability will increase, and
women will have little basis for trusting the employer’s prevention
policy.” 99
Thus, if a court finds that an employer did not exercise reasonable
care in comportment with the first prong of the affirmative defense, it
will necessarily find that the defense cannot preclude liability, because
the defense requires that both prongs be met. 100 This will obviate the
need for a victim of a one-time incident severe enough to confer Title
VII liability on her employer to argue her inability to report the harm
before it occurred.
This argument works both ways. In the case of a one-time incident
severe enough to confer liability on a defendant employer, the employer
should not, as a matter if law, be able to make out the second prong of
the affirmative defense, that “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided

terminated for harassment, they will not be liable for informing employees that another
employee or a supervisor assigned to their work area was found to have harassed in the
past, but is being given a chance to improve.
Id.
98. Professor West has advocated that courts require better record keeping and publicity when
it comes to reported instances of harassment by proposing that in order to ensure Title VII’s
jurisprudence comports and resonates more strongly with its stated goals of encouraging harm
prevention of harassment, “courts should require an employer to demonstrate the effectiveness of its
prevention policy by documenting for employees the actions it took in addressing prior sexual
harassment complaints.” West, supra note 9, at 497. The author maintains that “[p]roviding data
on an annual basis would . . . increase women's courage and would assist them in overcoming their
fears of complaining. It would also help prevent future sexual harassment, deterring would-be
harassers by informing them that such behavior could result in discipline or discharge.” Id. at 498.
99. Id. at 520.
100. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
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by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 101 This is tautological in
all cases of one-time instances of harassment, despite various courts’
assertions that as a matter of fairness to an unaware defendant, such a
reading of the requirement should not arrest the defense. 102 However, in
cases of a one-time incident perpetrated by a recidivist harasser, these
fairness concerns evaporate. 103
It is important to note that any so-called “penalty” imposed on
employers who situate a known harasser as a new victim’s supervisor by
such an analysis of the affirmative defense is only meted out after the
new harm has been inflicted; in other words, after the employer has been
shown to have lost any bet it placed on the harasser’s ability to cease his
behavior.
While no court has used the approach suggested above, some
inroads have been made. Several courts have already evinced some
open-mindedness in their adjudication of incidents like workplace rapes.
Some courts have already recognized that rote, mechanistic application
of the traditional framework and the affirmative defense may not always
best serve justice.
In the first place, courts have recognized that “workplace rapes”
need not always take place in the actual workplace to confer respondeat
superior liability on defendants who fail to adequately protect their
employees. This recognition evinces courts’ willingness to depart from
a strict insistence that any act occurring off the employer’s physical
premises cannot confer liability on the employer.
Moreover, under a negligence theory usually employed in cases of
co-worker harassment, courts have deemed employers to be on notice of
a harassing environment, whether or not any complaints have been filed.
Additionally, courts have deemed employers negligent in their failure to
cure the problem, and thus liable under Title VII for the harm inflicted.
Courts have recognized that even though a given plaintiff may not have
previously complained about a specific harasser, a defendant may be
deemed to be on notice of the harasser’s potential to inflict harm upon
those with whom he is situated such that formal prior notice in the form
of a complaint by the instant plaintiff may not be a prerequisite for
respondeat superior liability. The case of Ferris v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 104 which deals with an allegation of co-worker, 105 not supervisory,
101. Id. at 807 (emphasis added); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)
(emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004).
103. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001).
104. Id.
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rape and harassment, is instructive on these points. In that case, a female
flight attendant sued the airline for which she worked under Title VII
and made New York state law claims of negligent retention and
supervision after a co-worker, a male flight attendant, allegedly raped
her in his hotel room during her flight crew’s brief layover in a foreign
country. 106 The plaintiff raised evidence that the airline had previously
been on notice of her alleged rapist’s sexually abusive conduct,
including a prior alleged rape and sexual assault, with other coworkers. 107
With respect to the defendant’s duty to responsibly supervise the
alleged harasser, the court found that a reasonable trier of fact could
determine that the defendant’s negligence made it accountable for the
rape:
Delta had notice of Young’s proclivity to rape co-workers. The fact
that Young’s prior rapes were not of Ferris but of other co-workers is
not preclusive. If an employer is on notice of a likelihood that a
particular employee’s proclivities place other employees at
unreasonable risk of rape, the employer does not escape responsibility
to warn or protect likely future victims merely because the abusive
employee has not previously abused those particular employees. 108

The Court, however, tempered its holding by noting that:
[h]ad the earlier non-work related incidents consisted of less grave
conduct, such as off-duty flirtation, sexual innuendo, or crude talk, we
might agree that such off-premises, off-duty conduct does not
reasonably give notice of a likelihood that the person will represent a
danger to co-employees or import his harassment into a work
environment and therefore does not give rise to an employer’s duty to
protect co-workers. 109

Nonetheless, it stated, “rape is obviously a far more serious matter
[and t]he more egregious the abuse and the more serious the threat of
which the employer has notice, the more the employer will be required

105. “It is well settled that an employer can only be liable for harassment by a victim's coworker if the employer was negligent – that is, only if it failed to provide a reasonable avenue for
complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.” Ayers v. State of Conn. Judicial
Branch, No. Civ.3:99CV935 (AHN), 2002 WL 32094365, at *3 (D. Conn., March 28, 2002).
106. Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135.
107. Id. at 136.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 137.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
STONE_FINAL

1080

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1059

under a standard of reasonable care to take steps for the protection of
likely future victims.” 110
In Faragher, the Supreme Court expressly found that cases
involving “actual knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials
of an employer organization, of sufficiently harassing action by
subordinates, which the employer or its informed officers have done
nothing to stop” 111 can result in employer liability where “the combined
knowledge and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as
the employer’s adoption of the offending conduct and its results, quite as
if they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer’s policy.” 112
The proposed analysis of the prong of the affirmative defense is entirely
in comportment with this mandate.
VII. NEGLIGENT RETENTION
It is important to examine the common law torts of negligent hiring,
training, and retention when contemplating the form of analysis of the
affirmative defense as has been posited. Often, plaintiffs allege these
torts as pendant state law claims along with their Title VII claims where
they have been harassed by a recidivist supervisor. Both these claims
and the courts’ adjudication of the affirmative defense under Title VII
are steeped in negligence theory.
Based on traditional principles of agency law, an employer is liable
for his negligence or recklessness:
in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work
involving risk of harm to others; . . . in the supervision of the activity;
or . . . in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious
conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon
premises or with instrumentalities under his control. 113

The tort of negligent hiring, for example, thus typically confers
liability on an employer when: 1) the employer hires one whom, at the
time of the hiring, the employer knew, or should have known with the
exercise of ordinary care, was unfit, 114 2) through the negligent hiring of
the employee, the employee’s incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous

110. Id.
111. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998).
112. Id.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
114. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960
(5th Cir. 1994); Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 28 Fed. App’x 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2002);
Hutcherson v. Progressive Corp., 984 F.2d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 1993).
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characteristics proximately caused the resulting injuries, 115 and 3) an
employment or agency relationship exists between the tortfeasor and the
defendant employer. 116 Many states, however, have relatively low
thresholds when gauging an employer’s responsibility at the outset of an
employment relationship. 117 Some jurisdictions additionally require that
the hiring of the individual at issue create a foreseeable or unreasonable
risk of harm to third parties. 118 Once an employee is negligently hired,
the employer is obligated to exercise reasonable care to exercise control
over the employee to prevent him from harming others. 119 This is so
even if the employee is acting outside the scope of his employment, so
long as the employee is on the employer’s premises or on premises upon
which the employee is privileged to enter only as an employee. 120 If the
anticipated harm occurs, the employer may be liable for it, irrespective
of what the employee intended to do once he gained access to the injured
plaintiff. 121
In terms of an employer’s exercise of ordinary care to ascertain an
employee’s fitness, an employer is required to conduct a reasonable
investigation into a prospective employee’s work experience,
background, qualifications, and experience. 122 Liability will ultimately
hinge upon whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
employer exercised reasonable care in its investigation. 123 The query
undertaken by a court in adjudicating a negligent hiring suit will be
whether the employee posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
one situated in the plaintiff’s position. 124 Some indices that such a

115. Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Di Cosala v.
Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982); Carlsen v. Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 886 (Wash Ct.
App. 1994).
116. Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc. v. Stanley, 378 S.E.2d 857, 858-59 (Ga. 1989).
117. Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the Evaluation of
Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA L. REV. 521, 536
(2007) (“Much of the scholarship directed at employers advises them to avoid liability by checking
conviction records, despite the fact that negligent hiring case law has consistently failed to find a
general duty to check applicants’ criminal records.”).
118. Id. at 537.
119. Id.
120. Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 42 A.2d 1052, 1059-60 (Pa. 1999).
121. Id.
122. Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 440 (R.I. 1984);
Carlsen v. Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
123. Perryman v. DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 398 S.E.2d 745, 745-46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990);
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983); Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990
S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1998); Se. Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va.
1999).
124. Janssen v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 731 P.2d 163, 166 (Ha. 1987); Henley v. Prince

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
STONE_FINAL

1082

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1059

reasonably foreseeable risk existed are an employee’s discernible
violent, destructive, or dishonest tendencies. 125 Specifically, for
example, if an employer fails to do a background check on a new hire
with a criminal record for sexual assault, and that new employee
subsequently harasses or assaults someone in the workplace, the
employer should, in theory, be liable under a negligent hiring theory. 126
More specifically, an employer will be liable for its employee’s
assaults against a third party under a negligent retention theory where
the employer either knew or should have known, in its exercise of
ordinary care, that the employee had violent tendencies. 127 Employers
will also bear liability for their negligent retention of employees who
inflict harm upon third parties where precautionary mechanisms
implemented by the employers to ward off harm engendered by
predictable risks, are improperly administered, or are somehow deficient
in shielding innocent third parties from an unreasonable risk of harm at
the hands of a known offender. 128
However, the law of negligent hiring, training, and retention varies
from state to state making it difficult to prevail. Some states have
Workers’ Compensation statutes or other laws crafted by the judiciary or
the legislature which operate to foreclose such claims. 129 Several courts
have expressed doubt about or declined to answer the question of
whether a Title VII violation can serve as a predicate tort in those
jurisdictions that require that negligent retention, supervision, etc., entail
George’s County, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (Ma. App. Ct. 1986); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516
(N.J. 1982).
125. Island Associated Coop., Inc. v. Hartmann, 118 A.D.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
126. Background Checks for New Hires are a Must, N.J. RECORD, Sept. 18, 2007, at 1.
127. Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 28 Fed. App’x 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2002); Garcia v.
Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1986); Foster v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310-11 (Mass.
1988).
128. Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 720 (1st Cir. 1994).
129. See, e.g., Pickett v. Colonel of Spearfish, 209 F.Supp. 2d 999, 1005 (D.S.D. 2001).
According to South Dakota law,
[u]nless the employer has commanded or expressly authorized an assault, it cannot be
said to be the intentional from his standpoint any more than from the standpoint of any
third person. Realistically, it to him is just one more industrial mishap in the factory, of
the sort he has the right to consider exclusively covered by the compensation system.
Id. (quoting ARTHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
103.06[1] (2007); McClure v. Nolan, No. 96-2357-JWL, 1997 WL 458362, at *1 (D. Kan. July 15,
1997) (“Kansas law does not permit employees to sue their employers based on a theory of
negligent retention and/or supervision of another employee.”); Williams v. Dowell, No. LX-725-3,
1994 WL 1031277, at *3 (Va. Cir. July 25, 1994) (“Virginia's Supreme Court has held that there is
no cause of action for the tort of negligent supervision in Virginia.”); McClements v. Ford Motor
Co., 702 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Mi. 2005) (explaining that under Michigan state law, a common-law
claim for negligent retention cannot be premised on workplace sexual harassment).
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an employer’s disregard of an employee’s prior tortious acts. 130
Moreover, the standards for the torts of negligent retention, hiring, and
training have been interpreted by those courts willing and able to
entertain such claims in tandem with a Title VII claim as prohibitively
exacting and high in many cases.
In one 2007 Georgia district court case involving allegations of an
employer’s negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of a sexual
harasser, 131 the court identified the central issue as “whether the
employer knew or had reason to know that the employee was engaged in
harassing behavior.” 132 However, the court examined and rejected
evidence that another employee had told the employer’s human
resources employee about a third employee who had “hinted about
sexual harassment” by the supervisor at issue, alleged that he had an
affair with this third employee, and asserted that seven employees had
resigned because of him, resulting in the employer’s investigation into
these charges. 133 The court found this evidence insufficient to place the
defendant on notice that the supervisor “had a reputation for sexual
harassment.” 134 The court also rejected the contention that the
supervisor’s multiple sexual advances against the plaintiff were adequate
to place the defendant on notice, noting that “all of the sexual advances
occurred away from the workplace,” 135 even though one occurred on a
business trip and another happened on a lunch break during a work
day. 136 The court thus granted the defendant summary judgment on the
claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision because the
harassment was considered neither knowable nor foreseeable by the
defendant. 137
Other courts have been similarly demanding. In another recent case
from an Alabama federal court, 138 the plaintiff was wary of the man that
she later identified as her supervisory harasser “[f]rom day one of [her]
130. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 250 n.12 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e
decline to decide whether a Title VII violation can be the underlying tort for a negligent supervision
or retention claim under North Carolina law.”); Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 774
(4th Cir. 1997) (“On appeal, [plaintiff] argues that a violation of Title VII satisfies the underlying
tort requirement [for a negligent supervision/retention claim]. Because we find neither an
underlying tort nor a violation of Title VII, we need not address the question.”).
131. Orquiola v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
132. Id. at 1162.
133. Id. at 1139.
134. Id. at 1163.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1163-64.
138. Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (M.D. Ala. 2005).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
STONE_FINAL

1084

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1059

employment.” 139 She produced evidence that “[h]is sexual prowess was
a topic of conversation in the . . . distribution center. There were many
discussions among hourly employees about his alleged sexual affair with
a subordinate employee, and rumors abounded that he had impregnated
her.” 140 His verbal harassment of the plaintiff eventually “escalated into
physical contact.” 141 However, the court granted summary judgment to
the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims for negligent training, supervision
and retention, noting that under Alabama law, “the ‘incompetency’ of
the offending employee in a negligent supervision claim must be based
on an injury resulting from a tort which is recognized under Alabama
common law.” 142 Because, among other things, the plaintiff had not
“identified the underlying tort claim upon which she relie[d] to establish
her negligent supervision claim,” 143 the court noted that “under Alabama
law, ‘an independent cause of action for sexual harassment does not
exist.’” 144 Additionally, because of the defendant’s prompt attention to
plaintiff’s complaints, once made, the court rejected the contention that
the defendant had any actual knowledge of the supervisor’s harassing
tendencies. 145 The court similarly rejected the argument that the
defendant was on constructive notice of these tendencies based on the
private nature of the reported harassment and the fact that there was “no
evidence that another employee made a similar claim to a managerial
employee.” 146 The court held that it was “not persuaded that the
‘rumors’ of [the] alleged consensual affair with another subordinate
employee is sufficient to place [the defendant] on constructive notice of
[the supervisor’s] alleged propensity to engage in unwelcome sexually
harassing conduct.” 147
State courts have also made prohibitive demands of plaintiffs
alleging negligent hiring, retention, and training. A security guard
plaintiff in Brown v. Brown 148 asserted a negligent retention claim and
alleged that she had been raped by the defendant’s employee after
having complained about lewd comments that he had made to her about

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1080.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1100-01.
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. 2007).
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wanting to assault her. 149 Citing “concerns of foreseeability and duty,”
the court granted summary judgment to the defendant. 150 It noted that:
Employers generally do not assume their employees are potential
criminals, nor should they . . . . The harm suffered by plaintiff in this
case was a criminal rape. It is argued that this rape was a foreseeable
result of Brown’s offensive speech. We disagree. Without question,
Brown’s words were crude and highly offensive. Plaintiff’s complaints
to one of defendant’s plant managers that Brown’s comments were
offensive and made her uncomfortable, when coupled with her request
that defendant make Brown cease making such comments, gave
defendant awareness of Brown’s propensity for vulgarity and arguably
positioned her for remedies . . . . However, an employer can assume
that its employees will obey our criminal laws. Therefore, it cannot
reasonably anticipate that an employee’s lewd, tasteless comments are
an inevitable prelude to rape if those comments did not clearly and
unmistakably threaten particular criminal activity that would have put
a reasonable employer on notice of an imminent risk of harm to a
specific victim. Comments of a sexual nature do not inexorably lead to
criminal sexual conduct any more than an exasperated, angry comment
151
inexorably results in a violent criminal assault.

The court disavowed the holding “that an employee’s words alone
can never create a duty owed by the employer to a third party,”152 noting
that it would be “an entirely different case if Brown had threatened to
rape plaintiff and defendant was aware of these threats and failed to take
reasonable measures in response.” 153 This required level of precision
under the state law theory, however, is simply too high for most
plaintiffs to meet. As the dissent in Brown pointed out:
Plaintiff reported Brown’s conduct not once, not twice, but at least
three times to Brown’s supervisor . . . . Plaintiff told . . . the plant
manager, that Brown continually made crude sexual comments to her,
and she asked [him] to make Brown stop. Three other security guards
informed plaintiff that they, too, had complained to their superiors
regarding Brown’s conduct. Plaintiff also asked Brown to stop making
the comments on numerous occasions. Despite these multiple
complaints, and despite Gardner’s telling plaintiff each time that he
would “take care of it,” Brown continued to bombard plaintiff with his

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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sexually aggressive comments until he eventually raped her. . . . The
obligation to assess its employee’s fitness for a job falls on the
employer, not on the victims of that employee’s actions . . . . Indeed,
the essence of a negligent retention claim is that the employer breached
a duty to ensure that the workplace was safe . . . . 154

Taking issue with the majority’s finding that “sexually aggressive
comments can never put an employer on notice,” 155 and that “absent a
criminal record or violent history, an employer cannot be held liable,
‘solely on the basis of the employee’s lewd comments,’” 156 the dissent
argued that “any number of things can suffice to provide notice to the
employer that its retention of a particular employee may need a second
look.” 157 Thus, it argued, the majority’s “new rule, . . . that as a matter of
law, employers who are notified that an employee is verbally harassing
another in a sexually aggressive way can never be held liable for
retaining that employee if that employee undertakes to carry out the sick
sexual fantasies,” 158 is untenable. This is but one exposition of the ways
in which state courts have made the torts of negligent hiring, training,
and retention copiously difficult for plaintiffs to make out successfully.
Despite the fact that so many victims of recidivist harassers cannot
prevail on claims of negligent hiring, retention, and training, the
affirmative defense should nonetheless be read to permit a finding that
an employer who has ample notice of a supervisor’s harassing
tendencies or proclivities is liable for his recidivist acts. In the first
place, in Faragher, the Supreme Court expressly condoned a negligence
theory of Title VII liability, finding that cases involving “actual
knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials of an employer
organization, of sufficiently harassing action by subordinates, which the
employer or its informed officers have done nothing to stop” 159 can
result in employer liability where “the combined knowledge and inaction
may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as the employer’s adoption
of the offending conduct and its results, quite as if they had been
authorized affirmatively as the employer’s policy.” 160 The proposed
analysis of the efficacy of employers’ policies and efforts is entirely in
comportment with this mandate. Thus, “an employer may be charged

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 327 n.1 (Cavanagh, M., dissenting).
Id. at 328 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 330.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998).
Id. at 789.
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with constructive knowledge of previous sexual harassment by a
supervisor, even if unreported, if the harassment was so broad in scope,
and so permeated the workplace, that it must have come to the attention
of someone authorized to do something about it.” 161
Further, the language of the first prong of the affirmative defense
says that the employer must exercise “reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.” 162 As at least one
district court has noted, “[i]t is hornbook law that the term ‘reasonable
care’ defines the traditional negligence standard, which, of course,
requires proof that the [defendant] knew or should have known that . . .
sexual harassment was taking place, and did nothing to prevent its
continuance.” 163 The affirmative defense analysis should be done with a
careful eye toward what an employer ought to know or reasonably
foresee based upon that employer’s experience with and knowledge of a
harasser with an eye toward its responsibilities under Title VII. After all,
in a scenario in which a harassing supervisor is able to exact a tangible
employment action upon his victim, such as a demotion or a paycut, by
using the employer as his unwitting instrumentality and deceiving it into
thinking that such an action is warranted, liability is imputed to the
employer, irrespective of what the employer knew or expressly ratified.
In a scenario in which an employer, operated with constructive or actual
notice about an employee’s harassing tendencies, courts should be
obligated to at least delve into a qualitative and quantitative search of
that knowledge before denying the plaintiff Title VII relief on the basis
of the affirmative defense.
Moreover, the scope of Title VII and its aggressive aim to “strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes” 164 justifies the interposition of a heightened
standard of care when it comes to an employer’s ridding the workplace
of harassment, especially when it comes to physical violence inflicted in
the course of sexual harassment. If permitted to do so as a piece of
protective federal legislation, Title VII can operate to deter recidivist
161. Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 882-84 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing
E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mftg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1072 (C.D. Ill. 1998);
Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989); Huddleston v. Roger Dean
Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988)); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664,
673-74 (10th Cir. 1998)
162. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
163. Fall, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 883 n.14 (citing, inter alia, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 (5th ed. 1984)).
164. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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harassment and employer negligence where state tort claims cannot do
the job.
In light of the fact that both prongs of the affirmative defense must
be established for a defendant to preclude a finding of liability, the
second prong of the affirmative defense warrants special examination in
the context of recidivist harassment. A challenge to any plaintiff faced
with a one-time incident of harassment is the fact that she is rendered
incapable of utilizing a complaint mechanism to stem the harm prior to
its occurrence, and thus incapable of meeting the second prong of the
affirmative defense. The Fourth Circuit in Watkins explained this
principle:
[a]lthough the Supreme Court did not speak to this issue in
Burlington . . ., we cannot conceive that an employer that satisfies the
first element of the affirmative defense and that promptly and
adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment . . .
would be held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability to
satisfy the literal terms of the second element of the affirmative
defense. 165

The court continued, reasoning that “[s]uch a result would be
wholly contrary to a laudable purpose behind limitations on employer
liability identified by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries: to
promote conciliation.” 166
In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 167 the Eighth Circuit held that
the affirmative defense is available even where a severe act of
supervisory harassment engenders an actionable hostile work
environment prior to the victim’s opportunity to make a complaint,
providing that the employer “takes swift and effective action to insulate
the complaining employee from further harassment the moment the
employer learns about the harassing conduct.” 168 The court found that
“[w]ithout expressly advocating strict liability,” 169 the argument that a
plaintiff with no opportunity to report harassment could not have
unreasonably failed to act to prevent it, “when boiled down, leads
inevitably to strict liability,” 170 an intolerable result. Thus, the court
165. Watkins v. Professional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16
(4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
166. Id. (citing Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1999));
Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999).
167. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004).
168. Id. at 772.
169. Id. at 771.
170. Id.
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determined, “[s]trict adherence to the . . . affirmative defense in this case
is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole,” 171 and it was
necessary to craft this “modified Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense.” 172
Irrespective of the wisdom of this “modified defense” generally, 173
its application is wholly unjust in the case of a recidivist harasser who
has engaged in a single act of harassment with a new victim. 174 In
McCurdy, the court deemed it “a fair question to ask who should bear
the responsibility for a single incident of supervisor sexual harassment,
an innocent employee . . . or an employer like the ASP who effectively
stops the harassment after it learns about it.” 175 The court noted that the
Supreme Court did not contemplate a one-time incident when it crafted
the affirmative defense, but that:
[t]o reach a conclusion that the affirmative defense is unavailable in
single incident cases in which the employee takes advantage of
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer and
the employer thereafter takes swift and effective action to avoid further
offensive conduct stands the underlying policy behind the affirmative
defense on its head. 176

The court found that “[d]enying such an employer an opportunity to
avail itself of the affirmative defense, when the employer has done all
that an employer could reasonably be expected to do to avoid and
remedy the offending behavior, effectively creates strict liability for
employers in a single incident case.” 177
However, in the case of a recidivist harasser, an employer has not
done all that it could be reasonably expected to do to stem the harmful
behavior in the workplace, or at least to ensure that no additional
employees would fall victim to it. For this reason courts should find
that, in the case of recidivist harassment, a victim has not unreasonably
failed to avail herself of effective channels of complaint where she, with
no warning, sustained a single incident of harm severe enough to be
actionable on its own. Notwithstanding, a court need only find that one

171. Id.
172. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772.
173. See John C. Ayres, Note, Is It Sexual Harassment Or Not? The Single Incident Exception:
McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 71 MO. L. REV. 205, 221-22 (2006).
174. Id. at 221-26.
175. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772.
176. Id.
177. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
STONE_FINAL

1090

3/23/2009 3:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1059

of the two prongs of the affirmative defense was not met for liability to
be conferred upon a defendant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The current way in which courts approach the framework for
adjudicating sexual harassment cases brought under Title VII does an
immense disservice to victims of recidivist harassment. Because courts
have sanctioned, and thus incentivized employers’ mere movement of
harassers around an enterprise and away from their prior victims, and
because so many who engage in harassment are likely to continue or
escalate their behavior without ample deterrence from doing so, new
victims of recidivist harassers are especially vulnerable. Courts need to
conduct their analyses of the affirmative defense available to defendants
with an eye toward whether or not the harasser at issue is a repeat
offender, and stop looking at each incident of harassment in a vacuum.
Only when employers are incentivized to view themselves and their
various departments as an integrated whole and to respond to each viable
complaint of harassment by actually exercising “reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” 178 will
the unwitting victims of one-time, often violent acts by recidivists stop
paying the price exacted by courts’ lenience.

178. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 807 (1998).
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